Reform Ahead: The Changes That Will Transform Public Procurement

The reform of the Public Procurement Code (CCP) and the Law of the Court of Auditors is primarily aimed at simplifying and reducing bureaucracy in public procurement procedures.

In our view, greater administrative efficiency is not incompatible with maintaining effective mechanisms for oversight and supervision. It should be noted that excessive procedural complexity is itself detrimental to the public interest; therefore, simplifying procurement procedures does not necessarily entail introducing greater arbitrariness in the selection of contractors.

Accordingly, the appropriate balance should be achieved by strengthening ex post oversight, which is fully compatible with the control and supervision of public administration. Raising the threshold for prior review of contracts—namely, contracts subject to the Court of Auditors' prior approval—does not diminish the Court's role; rather, it reconfigures the manner in which oversight is exercised. Indeed, this approach is consistent with the model already adopted in other European countries.

The current public procurement framework faces challenges in reconciling the principle of competition with the principle of pursuing the public interest, bearing in mind that the primary objective of contracting authorities is to respond effectively to public needs. Furthermore, economic operators now play a significant role in overseeing the system, as they are increasingly equipped to scrutinize the actions of contracting authorities and to resort to administrative and judicial remedies whenever they consider that their rights have been infringed. Consequently, greater procedural flexibility does not imply any departure from the fundamental principles of public procurement.

With regard to the substantial increase in the thresholds for the use of direct award procedures, a measure that may grant contracting authorities greater discretion, we consider that this update was both necessary and essential. It should be recalled that the thresholds applicable to direct awards have remained virtually unchanged for approximately a decade, and their revision allows pre-contractual procedures to better reflect current economic realities. Accordingly, when used within the limits established by law, the direct award procedure remains an essential instrument for enabling public authorities to respond promptly to their operational needs. Moreover, updating these thresholds may help reduce the artificial fragmentation of expenditure, allowing procurement procedures to be better aligned with market conditions.

As for the risks of corruption or undue favouritism, it is worth highlighting that the legislature has been strengthening transparency mechanisms through other initiatives. In this context, particular note should be taken of the entry into force of Law No. 5-A/2026, commonly referred to as the Lobbying Law, which establishes the Transparency Register for Interest Representation (RTRI), as well as the work already carried out under the General Framework for the Prevention of Corruption.

Nevertheless, not all of the proposed amendments warrant a positive assessment. Reservations should be expressed regarding the introduction of criteria that may be considered insufficiently rigorous for determining the estimated value of contracts, particularly the definition of such value as the price expected to be paid by the contracting authority. This approach may create legal uncertainty and give rise to difficulties in reconciling procurement rules with the requirements of public accounting and public expenditure procedures. In addition, concerns have been raised regarding the increasing flexibility in the weighting of price within multi-factor award models. Although European Union policy has consistently encouraged the integration of environmental, social, and labour considerations into public procurement, we believe that placing greater emphasis on price may undermine the effective implementation of these horizontal policy objectives by allowing price to remain the predominant factor in the selection of economic operators.